Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stephen Smalley
a74574aafe [PATCH] Remove security_inode_post_create/mkdir/symlink/mknod hooks
This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as
they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic
inode security labeling.

If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now.  Also,
is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be
removed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:57:28 -07:00
Stephen Smalley
5e41ff9e06 [PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labeling
The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created
inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state during the inode creation transaction.  This parallels the
existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes.  Otherwise, it
is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache
prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the
post_create/mkdir/...  LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be
left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash.  SELinux presently works
around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is
initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes
(in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but
potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses.  A simple test
program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the
problem.  Similar such false denials have been encountered in real
applications.

This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security
attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode
security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation
to SELinux.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:57:27 -07:00
Stephen Smalley
782ebb992e [PATCH] selinux: Reduce memory use by avtab
This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node
size and reducing the number of avtab nodes.  The memory savings are
substantial, e.g.  on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the
following data for the targeted and strict policies:

            #objs  objsize   kernmem
Targeted:
  Before:  237888       40     9.1MB
  After:    19968       24     468KB

Strict:
  Before:  571680       40   21.81MB
  After:   221052       24    5.06MB

The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security
server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only
required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris
using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any
significant degradation.

Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain
(libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of
this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied
even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size).
Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the
sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and
tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-05 00:05:50 -07:00
James Morris
f5c1d5b2aa [PATCH] SELinux: default labeling of MLS field
Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field.  This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.

With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file).  This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.

This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-07-28 08:39:02 -07:00
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
09ffd94fb1 [PATCH] selinux: add executable heap check
This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.

The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.

The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-25 16:24:26 -07:00
Lorenzo Hernandez García-Hierro
6b9921976f [PATCH] selinux: add executable stack check
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g.  perform runtime code
generation.  Note that this does not yet address thread stacks.  Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.

The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)

The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch

policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.

kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-25 16:24:26 -07:00
James Morris
b207a290ea [PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processing
This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.

1.  We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
   reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem.  The AUDIT_GET
   operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
   subsystem (e.g.  whether it's enabled etc.).  The AUDIT_LIST operation
   however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
   privileged by the audit folk.  To deal with this, a new SELinux
   permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
   nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
   domains.  Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.

2.  There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
   from userspace.  These events need to be collected by the kernel,
   collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon.  An
   example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
   login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
   relayed back to auditd via the kernel.  To prevent handing out
   nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
   added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
   passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
   written to the kernel.

Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-05-01 08:58:40 -07:00
James Morris
0c9b79429c [PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it.  For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only.  Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.

Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16 15:24:13 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00