android_system_sepolicy/private/platform_app.te

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###
### Apps signed with the platform key.
###
typeattribute platform_app coredomain;
app_domain(platform_app)
# Access the network.
net_domain(platform_app)
# Access bluetooth.
bluetooth_domain(platform_app)
# Read from /data/local/tmp or /data/data/com.android.shell.
allow platform_app shell_data_file:dir search;
allow platform_app shell_data_file:file { open getattr read };
allow platform_app icon_file:file { open getattr read };
# Populate /data/app/vmdl*.tmp, /data/app-private/vmdl*.tmp files
# created by system server.
allow platform_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow platform_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file rw_file_perms;
allow platform_app apk_private_data_file:dir search;
# ASEC
allow platform_app asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow platform_app asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
# Access to /data/media.
allow platform_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow platform_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Write to /cache.
allow platform_app cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow platform_app cache_file:file create_file_perms;
# Direct access to vold-mounted storage under /mnt/media_rw
# This is a performance optimization that allows platform apps to bypass the FUSE layer
allow platform_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow platform_app sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow platform_app sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
# com.android.systemui
allow platform_app rootfs:dir getattr;
domain_deprecated: remove proc access Remove "granted" logspam. Grante the observed permissions to the individual processes that need them and remove the permission from domain_deprecated. avc: granted { read open } for comm="ndroid.settings" path="/proc/version" dev="proc" ino=4026532081 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/proc/pagetypeinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532129 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt" path="/proc/cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026532072 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id" dev="proc" ino=15852829 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="tiveportallogin" path="/proc/vmstat" dev="proc" ino=4026532130 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file This change is specifically not granting the following since it should not be allowed: avc: granted { read open } for comm="crash_dump64" path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="crash_dump64" name="filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="crash_dump64" path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file Bug: 64032843 Bug: 28760354 Test: build Change-Id: Ib309e97b6229bdf013468dca34f606c0e8da96d0
2017-07-25 16:43:49 -07:00
# com.android.captiveportallogin reads /proc/vmstat
allow platform_app {
proc_vmstat
}:file r_file_perms;
domain_deprecated: remove proc access Remove "granted" logspam. Grante the observed permissions to the individual processes that need them and remove the permission from domain_deprecated. avc: granted { read open } for comm="ndroid.settings" path="/proc/version" dev="proc" ino=4026532081 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/proc/pagetypeinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532129 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt" path="/proc/cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026532072 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id" dev="proc" ino=15852829 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for comm="tiveportallogin" path="/proc/vmstat" dev="proc" ino=4026532130 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file This change is specifically not granting the following since it should not be allowed: avc: granted { read open } for comm="crash_dump64" path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for comm="crash_dump64" name="filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for comm="crash_dump64" path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file Bug: 64032843 Bug: 28760354 Test: build Change-Id: Ib309e97b6229bdf013468dca34f606c0e8da96d0
2017-07-25 16:43:49 -07:00
Start the process of locking down proc/net Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs. To that end, this change: * Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower priority than apps. * Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API. * Audits all other proc/net access for apps. * Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold. Bug: 9496886 Bug: 68016944 Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call. Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs. Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and "Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup. Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases Test: atest netd_integration_test Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457 (cherry picked from commit 087318957f26e921d62f2e234fc14bff3c59030e)
2018-04-10 12:47:48 -07:00
# /proc/net access.
# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
r_dir_file(platform_app, proc_net_type)
userdebug_or_eng(`
auditallow platform_app proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
allow platform_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app radio_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app thermal_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app timezone_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app stats_service:service_manager find;
# Allow platform apps to interact with gpuservice
binder_call(platform_app, gpuservice)
# Allow platform apps to log via statsd.
binder_call(platform_app, statsd)
# Access to /data/preloads
allow platform_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow platform_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow platform_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
allow platform_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
read_runtime_log_tags(platform_app)
# allow platform apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow platform_app system_server:udp_socket {
connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
# allow platform apps to connect to the property service
set_prop(platform_app, test_boot_reason_prop)
# allow platform apps to create symbolic link
allow platform_app app_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as platform_app
neverallow platform_app fuse_device:chr_file *;