2017-12-20 18:51:15 -08:00
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# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged)
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type traced, domain, coredomain;
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type traced_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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# Allow init to exec the daemon.
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init_daemon_domain(traced)
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# Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change
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# class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by
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# the privileged process that controls it.
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allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice };
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### traced should NEVER do any of this
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# Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed
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# globally in domain.te).
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neverallow traced self:process execmem;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other process
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neverallow traced domain:process ptrace;
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# Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors
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# passed through the socket.
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2018-02-07 16:29:06 -08:00
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neverallow traced {
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data_file_type
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-system_data_file
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# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
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# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
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-vendor_data_file
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-zoneinfo_data_file
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}:dir *;
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neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search };
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2017-12-20 18:51:15 -08:00
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neverallow traced zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *;
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neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:file ~write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition;
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neverallow * traced:process dyntransition;
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