PWN-Hunter/android_system_sepolicy
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grant appdomain rw perms to tun_device

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Previously granted to only untrusted_app, allow all apps except
isolated_app read write permissions to tun_device.

avc: denied { read write } for path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=8906 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 26462997
Change-Id: Id6f5b09cda26dc6c8651eb76f6791fb95640e4c7
This commit is contained in:
Jeff Vander Stoep 2016-01-08 15:01:40 -08:00
parent 0d8e9adf49
commit 2b935cd78d
2 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
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4
app.te
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@ -222,6 +222,10 @@ selinux_check_context(appdomain)
auditallow { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } sysfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl };
auditallow { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } sysfs:file r_file_perms;
# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl append };
###
### Neverallow rules
###

4
untrusted_app.te
View File

@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
# Third party vpn apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
allow untrusted_app tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl append };
# ASEC
allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
# Execute libs in asec containers.