sepolicy - move public clatd to private

Clatd is effectively an internal implementation detail of netd.
It exists as a separate daemon only because this gives us a better
security boundary.  Netd is it's only launcher (via fork/exec) and
killer.

Generated via:
  { echo; cat public/clatd.te; echo; } >> private/clatd.te
  rm -f public/clatd.te

  plus a minor edit to put coredomain after clatd type declaration
  and required changes to move netd's clatd use out of public into private.

Test: build and install on non-aosp test device, atest, check for selinux clat denials
Change-Id: I80f110b75828f3657986e64650ef9e0f9877a07c

private/clatd.te

@@ -1 +1,36 @@
-typeattribute clatd coredomain;
+# 464xlat daemon
+type clatd, domain, coredomain;
+type clatd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(clatd)
+
+r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net_type)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow clatd proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
+
+# Access objects inherited from netd.
+allow clatd netd:fd use;
+allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
+# TODO: Check whether some or all of these sockets should be close-on-exec.
+allow clatd netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:udp_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
+
+# clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
+# capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
+# under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. If the latter check succeeds clatd won't have
+# needed CAP_IPC_LOCK. But this is not guaranteed to succeed on all devices
+# so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
+# See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
+# https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
+
+allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

private/netd.te

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(netd)
 # Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
 domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
 
-# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain
+# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain and kill it
 domain_auto_trans(netd, clatd_exec, clatd)
+allow netd clatd:process signal;
 
 # give netd permission to setup iptables rule with xt_bpf, attach program to cgroup, and read/write
 # the map created by bpfloader

public/clatd.te

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# 464xlat daemon
-type clatd, domain;
-type clatd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
-
-net_domain(clatd)
-
-r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net_type)
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow clatd proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
-')
-
-# Access objects inherited from netd.
-allow clatd netd:fd use;
-allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
-# TODO: Check whether some or all of these sockets should be close-on-exec.
-allow clatd netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
-allow clatd netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
-allow clatd netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
-allow clatd netd:udp_socket { read write };
-allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
-
-allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
-
-# clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
-# capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
-# under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. If the latter check succeeds clatd won't have
-# needed CAP_IPC_LOCK. But this is not guaranteed to succeed on all devices
-# so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
-# See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
-# https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
-allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
-
-allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
-allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
-allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

public/netd.te

@@ -81,9 +81,6 @@ allow netd system_file:file lock;
 # Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
 allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
 
-# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain
-allow netd clatd:process signal;
-
 set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
 set_prop(netd, netd_stable_secret_prop)