PWN-Hunter/android_system_sepolicy
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Remove several superuser capabilities from unconfined domains.

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Remove sys_ptrace and add a neverallow for it.
Remove sys_rawio and mknod, explicitly allow to kernel, init, and recovery,
and add a neverallow for them.
Remove sys_module.  It can be added back where appropriate in device
policy if using a modular kernel.  No neverallow since it is device
specific.

Change-Id: I1a7971db8d247fd53a8f9392de9e46250e91f89b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Smalley 2014-02-10 16:31:04 -05:00
parent 3db328fd2c
commit 5487ca00d4
5 changed files with 22 additions and 1 deletions
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10
domain.te
View File

@ -154,7 +154,17 @@ neverallow { domain -relabeltodomain } *:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
### neverallow rules
###
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow { domain -debuggerd -vold -dumpstate -system_server } self:capability sys_ptrace;
# Limit device node creation and raw I/O to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery -ueventd -watchdogd -healthd -vold } self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
# No domain needs mac_override as it is unused by SELinux.
neverallow domain self:capability2 mac_override;
# Only recovery needs mac_admin to set contexts not defined in current policy.
neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin;
# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.

2
init.te
View File

@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ relabelto_domain(init)
# add a rule to handle unlabelled mounts
allow init unlabeled:filesystem mount;
allow init self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
allow init fs_type:filesystem *;
allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow init kernel:security load_policy;

5
kernel.te
View File

@ -16,3 +16,8 @@ allow kernel self:security setenforce;
# Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
# For operations performed by kernel or init prior to switching to init domain.
## TODO: Investigate whether it is safe to remove these
allow kernel self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
auditallow kernel self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };

4
recovery.te
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@ -13,3 +13,7 @@ allow recovery fs_type:filesystem *;
allow recovery self:process execmem;
allow recovery ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
allow recovery tmpfs:file rx_file_perms;
## TODO: Investigate whether it is safe to remove these
allow recovery self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
auditallow recovery self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };

2
unconfined.te
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
# The use of this template is discouraged.
######################################################
allow unconfineddomain self:capability *;
allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module };
allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:system *;