Add label update_engine_log_data_file for log files created by
update engine in directory /data/misc/update_engine_log.
Bug: 65568605
Test: manual
Change-Id: I379db82a0ea540e41cb3b8e03f93d9ce64fac7c9
New types:
1. proc_random
2. sysfs_dt_firmware_android
Labeled:
1. /proc/sys/kernel/random as proc_random.
2. /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/{compatible, fstab,
vbmeta} as sysfs_dt_firmware_android.
Changed access:
1. uncrypt, update_engine, postinstall_dexopt have access to generic proc
and sysfs labels removed.
2. appropriate permissions were added to uncrypt, update_engine,
update_engine_common, postinstall_dexopt.
Bug: 67416435
Bug: 67416336
Test: fake ota go/manual-ab-ota runs without denials
Test: adb sideload runs without denials to new types
Change-Id: Id31310ceb151a18652fcbb58037a0b90c1f6505a
Grant update_engine access to sysfs.
Ran fake ota go/manual-ab-ota, and this denial was fixed:
avc: denied { read } for pid=912 comm="update_engine" name="compatible"
dev="sysfs" ino=17399 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Test: boots with no new denials
Change-Id: I8697da3af254aea1cec44d9dbb1eca18be31859c
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.
Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open file:
stat/read/write/append.
This commit marks core data types as core_data_file_type and bans
access to non-core domains with an exemption for apps. A temporary
exemption is also granted to domains that currently rely on
access with TODOs and bug number for each exemption.
Bug: 34980020
Test: Build and boot Marlin. Make phone call, watch youtube video.
No new denials observed.
Change-Id: I320dd30f9f0a5bf2f9bb218776b4bccdb529b197
This switches Boot Control HAL policy to the design which enables us
to conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are
clients of Boot Control HAL.
Domains which are clients of Boot Control HAL, such as update_server,
are granted rules targeting hal_bootctl only when the Boot Control HAL
runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the
HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting
hal_bootctl are not granted to client domains.
Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Boot Control HAL,
such as hal_bootctl_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_bootctl.
P. S. This commit removes direct access to Boot Control HAL from
system_server because system_server is not a client of this HAL. This
commit also removes bootctrl_block_device type which is no longer
used. Finally, boot_control_hal attribute is removed because it is now
covered by the hal_bootctl attribute.
Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
1. make dist
2. Ensure device has network connectivity
3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I9c410c092069e431a3852b66c04c4d2a9f1a25cf
Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find
permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing
others from adding it. Only a particular domain should
add a particular service.
Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow
that prevents other domains from adding the service.
mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service.
Drop the add permission as it should just need the find
permission.
Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which
causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those
neverallow's so "self" can always find.
Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were
found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK.
Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
The service running the boot control HAL needs the permissions
provided by the boot_control_hal attribute. update_engine and
update_verifier still also need these permissions in order
to successfully call the new HAL in pass-through mode, but also
need permission to call the new service.
Bug: 31864052
Test: Built and confirmed no permission denials.
Change-Id: I2a6fdd5cf79b9e461d7cc14bd5b7abd6481ed911
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Grant boot_control_hal permissions to the hal_boot service;
update_engine and update_verifier can call that service rather
than using those permissions themselves.
Bug: 31864052
Test: `bootctl set-active-boot-slot 1`
Change-Id: I5188bc32e7933d4a0f5135b3246df119d3523d69
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
