Bug: http://b/135139675
Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type). Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.
Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.
Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
logcat.
Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
(cherry picked from commit ce9c0c5a5f)
System suspend service is not a HAL, so avoid using HAL-specific macros
and attributes.
Use system_suspend_server attribute for ISystemSuspend.hal permissions.
Use system_suspend type directly for internal .aidl interface
permissions.
Bug: 126259100
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: blueline boots; wakelocks can still be acquired; device suspends
if left alone.
Change-Id: Ie811e7da46023705c93ff4d76d15709a56706714
Move all app tmpfs types to appdomain_tmpfs. These are still protected
by mls categories and DAC. TODO clean up other app tmpfs types in a
separate change.
Treble-ize tmpfs passing between graphics composer HAL and
surfaceflinger.
Bug: 122854450
Test: boot Blueline with memfd enabled.
Change-Id: Ib98aaba062f10972af6ae80fb85b7a0f60a32eee
This is being done in preparation for the migration from ashmem to
memfd. In order for tmpfs objects to be usable across the Treble
boundary, they need to be declared in public policy whereas, they're
currently all declared in private policy as part of the
tmpfs_domain() macro. Remove the type declaration from the
macro, and remove tmpfs_domain() from the init_daemon_domain() macro
to avoid having to declare the *_tmpfs types for all init launched
domains. tmpfs is mostly used by apps and the media frameworks.
Bug: 122854450
Test: Boot Taimen and blueline. Watch videos, make phone calls, browse
internet, send text, install angry birds...play angry birds, keep
playing angry birds...
Change-Id: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
Merged-In: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
(cherry picked from commit e16fb9109c)
This patch extends the current debug-specific rules to cover user
builds. As a reminder, on user, the target process fork-execs a private
heapprofd process, which then performs stack unwinding & talking to the
central tracing daemon while staying in the target's domain. The central
heapprofd daemon is only responsible for identifying targets & sending
the activation signal. On the other hand, on debug, the central
heapprofd can handle all processes directly, so the necessary SELinux
capabilities depend on the build type.
These rules are necessary but not sufficient for profiling. For zygote
children, the libc triggering logic will also check for the app to
either be debuggable, or go/profileable.
For more context, see go/heapprofd-security & go/heapprofd-design.
Note that I've had to split this into two separate macros, as
exec_no_trans - which is necessary on user, but nice-to-have on debug -
conflicts with a lot of neverallows (e.g. HALs and system_server) for
the wider whitelisting that we do on debug builds.
Test: built & flashed on {blueline-userdebug, blueline-user}, activated profiling of whitelisted/not domains & checked for lack of denials in logcat.
Bug: 120409382
Change-Id: Id0defc3105b99f777bcee2046d9894a2b39c6a29
runas_app domain is used by lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to debug/profile
debuggable apps. But it misses permissions to ptrace app processes and
read /proc/<app_pid> directory.
Bug: none
Test: build and boot marlin.
Test: run lldb and simpleperf on apps with target sdk version 24-29.
Change-Id: I9e6f940ec81a8285eae8db3b77fb1251a25dedd0
llkd needs the ptrace capabilities and dac override to monitor for
live lock conditions on the stack dumps.
Test: compile
Bug: 33808187
Change-Id: Ibc1e4cc10395fa9685c4ef0ca214daf212a5e126
Quotes and backticks are sensitive characters and should never show up
in a comment. Fix comment to avoid the use of a single quote. Also fixes
a bug where certain rules were not getting included in the compiled
policy.
Fixes the following build warnings:
[ 3% 3564/114975] build out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/sepolicy_neverallows_intermediates/plat_pub_policy.conf
m4:system/sepolicy/public/te_macros:404: Warning: excess arguments to builtin `define' ignored
[ 3% 3578/114975] build out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/plat_sepolicy.cil_intermediates/plat_policy.conf
m4:system/sepolicy/public/te_macros:404: Warning: excess arguments to builtin `define' ignored
[ 3% 3579/114975] build out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/vendor_sepolicy.cil_intermediates/vendor_policy.conf
m4:system/sepolicy/public/te_macros:404: Warning: excess arguments to builtin `define' ignored
[ 3% 3607/114975] build out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/sepolicy_neverallows_intermediates/policy.conf
m4:system/sepolicy/public/te_macros:404: Warning: excess arguments to builtin `define' ignored
[ 3% 3677/114975] build out/target/product/taimen/obj/ETC/built_plat_sepolicy_intermediates/base_plat_policy.conf
m4:system/sepolicy/public/te_macros:404: Warning: excess arguments to builtin `define' ignored
Test: policy compiles and no warnings.
Change-Id: Ie32d8b536955b40888b79e3a93851d2ae297f8ee
Linux kernel 4.14+ SELinux starts explicit map
permission check for file mmap operations. For backards
compat, add mmap in more places where we explicitly
list out individual file permissions.
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: Idc4ca53769f2e7aa12ed93ab27191ed92da37a3e
The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
produce stack traces.
Bug: 111317528
Test: code compiles
Change-Id: I883df49d3e9bca62952c3b33d1c691786dd7df4d
build_test_only is used to denote rules that should not verified
as part of compliance testing.
Use this macro to exclude neverallow rules which we want to check as
part of build, but not CTS.
Bug: 80499271
Test: SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest on walleye has no more failure of type
"Type or attribute * used in neverallow undefined in policy being checked."
Number of failing test cases is reduced by 142.
Test: policy.conf used to check neverallows at build-time still retains
all neverallow rules.
Change-Id: I5f1b383d9096bb5a7b8c0f1bc008b5dd07419580
Since this attribute just associates a hal_attribute
with a given hwservice in the standard way.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot + sanity + test for denials
Change-Id: I545de165515387317e6920ce8f5e8c491f9ab24e
For sanity, this makes 'hal_attribute_hwservice_client'
be associated with a specific hwservice thus making things
consistent.
After this change, only configstore, hal_allocator, and the
fwk_* services are inconsistent with all other HALs.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot device, sanity tests, check for denials
Change-Id: Ibffc65c9567a429e07a3dc4dd41117738459dc2a
Before, it was possible to access a hwservice without declaring
that you were a client.
This introduces the following macro:
hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_foo, hal_foo_hwservice)
which makes sure the above implication holds using a neverallow rule.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot + sanity
Change-Id: Iededae68f14f0f3bd412c1205aa3b650a54d55c6
In order to support passthrough + binderized implementations
with a simple switch, there is a hierarchy of attributes for
different hal servers.
/------- hal_X --------\
| ** |
v v
hal_X_client hal_X_server
| |
| |
v v
halclientdomain halserverdomain
** - hal_X -> hal_X_server is only on non-Treble devices. This
is because on these devices, certain HALs are allowed to be
loaded directly into the client process in "passthrough" mode
as was the case in Android before Android O. This is a legacy
compatibility mode. On Treble devices, any client can also be
hal_X just by virtue of a server being able to also be a hal
client.
There is also one exception to this rule. su is not given every
hal_* permission. If it is given all of these permissions on
non-Treble devices, it must be added as an exemption to many
other neverallow rules. As a sideeffect (which existed before
this patch), su is not allowed to talk directly to all hardware
on non-Treble devices as with Treble devices.
Fixes: 34180936
Test: compile only (neverallow rules are resolved at compile time)
Change-Id: I47122daf95acd49cadaf8b7664e56268dac78945
The ConfirmationUI API has a callback interface by which confirmation
results are presented to the calling app. This requires keystore to call
into apps.
Test: Device boots and no more denials when call back is delivered to
apps.
Bug: 63928580
Change-Id: Ie23211aeb74c39956c3c3b8b32843d35afa1315a
The ConfirmationUI API has a callback interface by which confirmation
results are presented to the calling app. This requires keystore to call
into apps.
Test: Device boots and no more denials when call back is delivered to
apps.
Bug: 63928580
Change-Id: Ie23211aeb74c39956c3c3b8b32843d35afa1315a
aosp/605217 adds the following lines:
genfscon tracefs /options/print-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/print-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
However, the m4 pre-processing step of selinux policy compilation outputs:
genfscon tracefs /options/-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/-tgid u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
And as a result of the "print" it prints:
m4: system/sepolicy/private/genfs_contexts: 177:
m4: system/sepolicy/private/genfs_contexts: 203:
Due to the following macro:
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/sepolicy/+/oreo-mr1-dev/public/te_macros#580
This change removes the now-deprecated print macro to unblock
aosp/605217.
Bug: 72862003
Test: verify that the m4 output for aosp/605217 is correct.
Change-Id: Ia4ec96e16b98e8df241cceb64e3f3b7bea9a7f3d
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Test: build taimen-user/userdebug
Change-Id: I619e71529e078235ed30dc06c60e6e448310fdbc
This reverts commit ed876a5e96.
Fixes user builds.
libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 513 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 9149 of policy.conf) violated by allow update_verifier misc_block_device:blk_file { ioctl read write lock append open };
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
Error while expanding policy
Bug: 69566734
Test: build taimen-user
Change-Id: I969b7539dce547f020918ddc3e17208fc98385c4
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Change-Id: I83dcb33c3a057f126428f88a90b95f3f129d9f0e
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
domain based tmpfs file access has getattr, read and write.
However newer kernels support map. Add this map permission so they
can use mmap based access.
Test: build test.
Change-Id: I2e128967e10a1332b3c1c908550360a52fbceaf8
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
