9b2e0cbeea
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
74 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
74 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
# android user-space log manager
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type logd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type logd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
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r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
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r_dir_file(logd, proc_net)
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allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
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allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
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allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
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allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
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allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
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allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
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allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
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')
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allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;
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# Access device logging gating property
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get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)
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r_dir_file(logd, domain)
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allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;
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control_logd(logd)
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read_runtime_log_tags(logd)
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allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
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# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
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# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
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# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
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# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
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# expected to be locally cached).
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dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { open read };
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### logd should NEVER do any of this
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# Block device access.
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neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# ptrace any other app
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neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
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# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
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neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } logd:process ptrace;
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
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neverallow logd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
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# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
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neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
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neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;
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# protect the event-log-tags file
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neverallow {
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domain
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-init
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-logd
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} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;
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