9b2e0cbeea
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
18 lines
631 B
Plaintext
18 lines
631 B
Plaintext
##
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# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
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#
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type tee_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
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init_daemon_domain(tee)
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allow tee self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };
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allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)
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allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
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allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
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