618efe8cd3
Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { write } for pid=1 comm="init" path=2F6465762F5F5F6B6D73675F5F202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=7214 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
avc: denied { write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026534153 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
avc: denied { sys_boot } for pid=1 comm="init" capability=22 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0
(cherrypicked from commit e550e79c76)
Change-Id: I46be370d520c4492d97c6ed7ccdc55cc20b22c49
79 lines
3.0 KiB
Plaintext
79 lines
3.0 KiB
Plaintext
# Life begins with the kernel.
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type kernel, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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allow kernel self:capability sys_nice;
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# Allow init relabel itself.
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allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom;
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allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto;
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# TODO: investigate why we need this.
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allow kernel init:process share;
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# cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label.
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allow kernel unlabeled:dir search;
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# Mount usbfs.
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allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount;
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allow kernel usbfs:dir search;
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# Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
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# We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace
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# process from turning off SELinux once enabled.
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dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
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# Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain.
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allow kernel self:capability sys_resource;
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# Init reboot before switching selinux domains under certain error
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# conditions. Allow it.
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# As part of rebooting, init writes "u" to /proc/sysrq-trigger to
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# remount filesystems read-only. /data is not mounted at this point,
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# so we could ignore this. For now, we allow it.
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allow kernel self:capability sys_boot;
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allow kernel proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms;
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# Allow writing to /dev/__kmsg__ which was created prior to
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# loading policy
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allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file write;
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# Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
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allow kernel selinuxfs:file write;
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allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
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# MTP sync (b/15835289)
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# kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723)
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allow kernel untrusted_app:fd use;
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allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
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# Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116)
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# Kernel thread "loop0" reads a vold supplied file descriptor.
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# Fixes CTS tests:
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# * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountObbNormal
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# * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountTwoObbs
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allow kernel vold:fd use;
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allow kernel app_data_file:file read;
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allow kernel asec_image_file:file read;
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domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init)
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# The initial task starts in the kernel domain (assigned via
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# initial_sid_contexts), but nothing ever transitions to it.
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neverallow domain kernel:process { transition dyntransition };
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# The kernel domain is never entered via an exec, nor should it
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# ever execute a program outside the rootfs without changing to another domain.
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# If you encounter an execute_no_trans denial on the kernel domain, then
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# possible causes include:
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# - The program is a kernel usermodehelper. In this case, define a domain
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# for the program and domain_auto_trans() to it.
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# - You failed to setcon u:r:init:s0 in your init.rc and thus your init
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# program was left in the kernel domain and is now trying to execute
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# some other program. Fix your init.rc file.
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# - You are running an exploit which switched to the init task credentials
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# and is then trying to exec a shell or other program. You lose!
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neverallow kernel { file_type fs_type -rootfs }:file { entrypoint execute_no_trans };
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