f5446eb148
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
111 lines
3.2 KiB
Plaintext
111 lines
3.2 KiB
Plaintext
typeattribute incidentd coredomain;
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init_daemon_domain(incidentd)
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type incidentd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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binder_use(incidentd)
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wakelock_use(incidentd)
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# Allow setting process priority, protect from OOM killer, and dropping
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# privileges by switching UID / GID
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# TODO allow incidentd self:capability { setuid setgid sys_resource };
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# Allow incidentd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
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r_dir_file(incidentd, domain)
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allow incidentd self:capability {
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# Send signals to processes
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kill
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};
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# Allow executing files on system, such as:
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# /system/bin/toolbox
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# /system/bin/logcat
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# /system/bin/dumpsys
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allow incidentd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
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allow incidentd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Create and write into /data/misc/incidents
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allow incidentd incident_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow incidentd incident_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Get process attributes
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# TODO allow incidentd domain:process getattr;
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# Signal java processes to dump their stack and get the results
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# TODO allow incidentd { appdomain ephemeral_app system_server }:process signal;
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# TODO allow incidentd anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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# TODO allow incidentd anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
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# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in incidentd/utils.c
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allow incidentd {
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audioserver
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cameraserver
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drmserver
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inputflinger
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mediacodec
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mediadrmserver
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mediaextractor
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mediaserver
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sdcardd
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surfaceflinger
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}:process signal;
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# Allow incidentd to make binder calls to any binder service
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binder_call(incidentd, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(incidentd, appdomain)
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# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
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# TODO allow incidentd self:capability sys_ptrace;
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# Run a shell.
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allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
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# TODO read_logd(incidentd)
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# TODO control_logd(incidentd)
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# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
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# Others can be whitelisted individually.
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allow incidentd {
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system_server_service
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app_api_service
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system_api_service
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}:service_manager find;
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# Only incidentd can publish the binder service
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add_service(incidentd, incident_service)
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# Allow pipes from (and only from) incident
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allow incidentd incident:fd use;
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allow incidentd incident:fifo_file write;
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# Allow incident to call back to incident with status updates.
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binder_call(incidentd, incident)
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# only system_server, system_app and incident command can find the incident service
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neverallow { domain -system_server -system_app -incident -incidentd } incident_service:service_manager find;
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# only incidentd and the other root services in limited circumstances
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# can get to the files in /data/misc/incidents
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#
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# write, execute, append are forbidden almost everywhere
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neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:file {
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w_file_perms
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x_file_perms
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create
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rename
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setattr
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unlink
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append
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};
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# read is also allowed by system_server, for when the file is handed to dropbox
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neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold -system_server } incident_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# limited access to the directory itself
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neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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