0c9708b2af
For unlabeled files, revert to DAC rules. This is for backwards compatibility, as files created before SELinux was in place may not be properly labeled. Over time, the number of unlabeled files will decrease, and we can (hopefully) remove this rule in the future. To prevent inadvertantly introducing the "relabelto" permission, add a neverallow domain, and add apps which have a legitimate need to relabel to this domain. Bug: 9777552 Change-Id: I71b0ff8abd4925432062007c45b5be85f6f70a88
311 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
311 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
#####################################
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# domain_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
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# Allow a transition from olddomain to newdomain
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# upon executing a file labeled with type.
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# This only allows the transition; it does not
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# cause it to occur automatically - use domain_auto_trans
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# if that is what you want.
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#
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define(`domain_trans', `
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# Old domain may exec the file and transition to the new domain.
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allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute };
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allow $1 $3:process transition;
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# New domain is entered by executing the file.
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allow $3 $2:file { entrypoint read execute };
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# New domain can send SIGCHLD to its caller.
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allow $3 $1:process sigchld;
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# Enable AT_SECURE, i.e. libc secure mode.
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dontaudit $1 $3:process noatsecure;
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# XXX dontaudit candidate but requires further study.
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allow $1 $3:process { siginh rlimitinh };
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')
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#####################################
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# domain_auto_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
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# Automatically transition from olddomain to newdomain
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# upon executing a file labeled with type.
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#
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define(`domain_auto_trans', `
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# Allow the necessary permissions.
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domain_trans($1,$2,$3)
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# Make the transition occur by default.
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type_transition $1 $2:process $3;
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')
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#####################################
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# file_type_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
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# Allow domain to create a file labeled file_type in a
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# directory labeled dir_type.
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# This only allows the transition; it does not
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# cause it to occur automatically - use file_type_auto_trans
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# if that is what you want.
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#
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define(`file_type_trans', `
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# Allow the domain to add entries to the directory.
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allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
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# Allow the domain to create the file.
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allow $1 $3:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
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')
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#####################################
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# file_type_auto_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
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# Automatically label new files with file_type when
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# they are created by domain in directories labeled dir_type.
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#
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define(`file_type_auto_trans', `
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# Allow the necessary permissions.
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file_type_trans($1, $2, $3)
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# Make the transition occur by default.
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type_transition $1 $2:dir $3;
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type_transition $1 $2:notdevfile_class_set $3;
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')
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#####################################
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# r_dir_file(domain, type)
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# Allow the specified domain to read directories, files
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# and symbolic links of the specified type.
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define(`r_dir_file', `
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allow $1 $2:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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')
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#####################################
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# unconfined_domain(domain)
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# Allow the specified domain to do anything.
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#
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define(`unconfined_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 mlstrustedsubject;
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typeattribute $1 unconfineddomain;
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')
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#####################################
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# tmpfs_domain(domain)
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# Define and allow access to a unique type for
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# this domain when creating tmpfs / shmem / ashmem files.
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define(`tmpfs_domain', `
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type $1_tmpfs, file_type;
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type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs;
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# Map with PROT_EXEC.
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allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read execute execmod };
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')
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#####################################
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# init_daemon_domain(domain)
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# Set up a transition from init to the daemon domain
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# upon executing its binary.
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define(`init_daemon_domain', `
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domain_auto_trans(init, $1_exec, $1)
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tmpfs_domain($1)
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')
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#####################################
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# app_domain(domain)
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# Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps.
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define(`app_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 appdomain;
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# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
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tmpfs_domain($1)
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')
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#####################################
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# relabelto_domain(domain)
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# Allows this domain to use the relabelto permission
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define(`relabelto_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 relabeltodomain;
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')
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#####################################
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# platform_app_domain(domain)
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# Allow permissions specific to platform apps.
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define(`platform_app_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 platformappdomain;
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typeattribute $1 mlstrustedsubject;
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')
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#####################################
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# net_domain(domain)
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# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
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define(`net_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 netdomain;
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')
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#####################################
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# bluetooth_domain(domain)
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# Allow a base set of permissions required for bluetooth access.
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define(`bluetooth_domain', `
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typeattribute $1 bluetoothdomain;
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')
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#####################################
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# unix_socket_connect(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
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# Allow a local socket connection from clientdomain via
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# socket to serverdomain.
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define(`unix_socket_connect', `
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allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
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allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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')
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#####################################
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# unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
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# Allow a local socket send from clientdomain via
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# socket to serverdomain.
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define(`unix_socket_send', `
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allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
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allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
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')
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#####################################
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# binder_use(domain)
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# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
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define(`binder_use', `
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# Call the servicemanager and transfer references to it.
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allow $1 servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
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# Map /dev/ashmem with PROT_EXEC.
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allow $1 ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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# rw access to /dev/binder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
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# all domains in domain.te.
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')
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#####################################
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# binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain)
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# Allow clientdomain to perform binder IPC to serverdomain.
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define(`binder_call', `
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# Call the server domain and optionally transfer references to it.
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allow $1 $2:binder { call transfer };
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# Allow the serverdomain to transfer references to the client on the reply.
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allow $2 $1:binder transfer;
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# Receive and use open files from the server.
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allow $1 $2:fd use;
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')
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#####################################
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# binder_service(domain)
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# Mark a domain as being a Binder service domain.
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# Used to allow binder IPC to the various system services.
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define(`binder_service', `
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typeattribute $1 binderservicedomain;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_check_access(domain)
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# Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs.
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define(`selinux_check_access', `
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1 kernel:security compute_av;
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allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket *;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_check_context(domain)
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# Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs.
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define(`selinux_check_context', `
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1 kernel:security check_context;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_getenforce(domain)
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# Allow domain to check whether SELinux is enforcing.
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define(`selinux_getenforce', `
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_setenforce(domain)
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# Allow domain to set SELinux to enforcing.
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define(`selinux_setenforce', `
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1 kernel:security setenforce;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_setbool(domain)
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# Allow domain to set SELinux booleans.
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define(`selinux_setbool', `
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1 kernel:security setbool;
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')
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#####################################
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# security_access_policy(domain)
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# Read only access to all policy files and
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# selinuxfs
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define(`security_access_policy', `
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allow $1 security_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 security_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 security_file:lnk_file read;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 rootfs:file r_file_perms;
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')
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#####################################
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# selinux_manage_policy(domain)
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# Ability to manage policy files,
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# trigger runtime reload, change
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# enforcing mode, manipulate booleans
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# and access kernel logs.
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define(`selinux_manage_policy', `
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selinux_setenforce($1)
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selinux_setbool($1)
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security_access_policy($1)
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unix_socket_connect($1, property, init)
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allow $1 security_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow $1 security_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow $1 security_prop:property_service set;
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')
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#####################################
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# mmac_manage_policy(domain)
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# Ability to manage mmac policy files,
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# trigger runtime reload, change
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# mmac enforcing mode and access logcat.
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define(`mmac_manage_policy', `
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unix_socket_connect($1, property, init)
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allow $1 security_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow $1 security_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow $1 security_prop:property_service set;
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')
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#####################################
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# access_logcat(domain)
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# Ability to read from logcat logs
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# and execute the logcat command
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define(`access_logcat', `
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allow $1 log_device:chr_file read;
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allow $1 system_file:file x_file_perms;
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')
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#####################################
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# access_kmsg(domain)
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# Ability to read from kernel logs
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# and execute the klogctl syscall
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# in a non destructive manner. See
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# man 2 klogctl
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define(`access_kmsg', `
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allow $1 kernel:system syslog_read;
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')
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#####################################
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# write_klog(domain)
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# Ability to write to kernel log via
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# klog_write()
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# See system/core/libcutil/klog.c
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define(`write_klog', `
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type_transition $1 device:chr_file klog_device "__kmsg__";
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allow $1 klog_device:chr_file { create open write unlink };
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allow $1 device:dir { add_name remove_name };
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')
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#####################################
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# Non system_app application set
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#
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define(`non_system_app_set', `{ appdomain -system_app }')
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