7a4af30b38
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
42 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
42 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
typeattribute netutils_wrapper coredomain;
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r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, system_file);
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# For netutils (ip, iptables, tc)
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allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
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allow netutils_wrapper system_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
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allow netutils_wrapper proc_net_type:file { open read getattr };
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allow netutils_wrapper self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
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allow netutils_wrapper self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
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allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
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# ip utils need everything but ioctl
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allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_route_socket ~ioctl;
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allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_xfrm_socket ~ioctl;
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# For netutils (ndc) to be able to talk to netd
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allow netutils_wrapper netd_socket:sock_file { open getattr read write append };
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allow netutils_wrapper netd:unix_stream_socket { read getattr connectto };
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# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
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# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
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# program when reloading the rule.
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allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:dir search;
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allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:file { read write };
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allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
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# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
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r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, net_data_file)
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domain_auto_trans({
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domain
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-coredomain
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-appdomain
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}, netutils_wrapper_exec, netutils_wrapper)
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# suppress spurious denials
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dontaudit netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
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# netutils wrapper may only use the following capabilities.
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neverallow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw };
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