f5446eb148
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
38 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
38 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
# blkid for untrusted block devices
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typeattribute blkid_untrusted coredomain;
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# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
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allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
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allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
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allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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# For blkid launched through popen()
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allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
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neverallow blkid_untrusted {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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dm_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
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neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
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neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
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neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
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