android_system_sepolicy/private/rs.te
Nick Kralevich 99a5103585 rs.te: Allow ephemeral_app FD use
Allow renderscript to use file descriptors created by ephemeral apps.
This is needed to support renderscript execution by ephemeral apps.

Steps to reproduce:

  atest com.google.android.pm.gts.PackageManagerHostTest#testRenderScriptLoading

Expected:

  Test passes

Actual:
  03-26 03:33:45.373  4607  4607 F linker  : CANNOT LINK EXECUTABLE "/system/bin/bcc": can't enable GNU RELRO protection for "": Permission denied
  03-26 03:33:45.373  4566  4600 E RenderScript: Child process "/system/bin/bcc" terminated with status 256
  03-26 03:33:45.373  4566  4600 E RenderScript: bcc: FAILS to compile 'init_test'
  03-26 03:33:45.374  4566  4596 E TestRunner: failed: testRenderScriptLoading(com.google.android.gts.packagemanager.InstantAppTestCases)
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner: ----- begin exception -----
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner: java.lang.AssertionError: Instant App should be able to access RenderScript APIs.
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner:  at org.junit.Assert.fail(Assert.java:88)
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner:  at com.google.android.gts.packagemanager.InstantAppTestCases.testRenderScriptLoading(InstantAppTestCases.java:338)
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner:  at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
  03-26 03:33:45.375  4566  4596 E TestRunner:  at org.junit.runners.model.FrameworkMethod$1.runReflectiveCall(FrameworkMethod.java:50)

Additional notes: Confusingly ephemeral_app is not part of untrusted_app_all,
but it is part of all_untrusted_apps, which is used for neverallow
assertions.

Bug: 129356700
Test: atest com.google.android.pm.gts.PackageManagerHostTest#testRenderScriptLoading
Change-Id: I47781012b9fd2cd1d03a3d50bed0c693bcf9ec7b
2019-04-02 13:59:39 -07:00

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# Any files which would have been created as app_data_file
# will be created as app_exec_data_file instead.
allow rs app_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow rs app_exec_data_file:file create_file_perms;
type_transition rs app_data_file:file app_exec_data_file;
# Follow /data/user/0 symlink
allow rs system_data_file:lnk_file read;
# Read files from the app home directory.
allow rs app_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow rs app_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Cleanup app_exec_data_file files in the app home directory.
allow rs app_data_file:dir remove_name;
# Use vendor resources
allow rs vendor_file:dir r_dir_perms;
r_dir_file(rs, vendor_overlay_file)
r_dir_file(rs, vendor_app_file)
# Read contents of app apks
r_dir_file(rs, apk_data_file)
allow rs gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow rs ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow rs same_process_hal_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
# File descriptors passed from app to renderscript
allow rs { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app }:fd use;
# rs can access app data, so ensure it can only be entered via an app domain and cannot have
# CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
neverallow rs rs:capability_class_set *;
neverallow { domain -appdomain } rs:process { dyntransition transition };
neverallow rs { domain -crash_dump }:process { dyntransition transition };
neverallow rs app_data_file:file_class_set ~r_file_perms;
# rs should never use network sockets
neverallow rs *:network_socket_class_set *;