android_system_sepolicy/private/incidentd.te
Joe Onorato 9cc5c09be5 Allow incidentd to communicate with clients over pipes.
Previously we dumped the data into dropbox.  This improves a couple
things:
  - We write into dropbox via the fd, so dropbox doesn't pull from the
    incidentd directory anymore.
  - There is a new API to for priv apps to explicitly read incident
    reports. That gives incidentd finer grained control over who can
    read it (specifically, it only allows apps to access the incident
    reports they requested, or were requested for them via statsd,
    instead of getting DUMP and reading whatever they want from
    dropbox).

Test: bit incident_test:* GtsIncidentManagerTestCases:*
Bug: 123543706
Change-Id: I9a323e372c4ff95d91419a61e8a20ea5a3a860a5
2019-03-22 17:04:49 -07:00

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typeattribute incidentd coredomain;
typeattribute incidentd mlstrustedsubject;
init_daemon_domain(incidentd)
type incidentd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
binder_use(incidentd)
wakelock_use(incidentd)
# Allow incidentd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
r_dir_file(incidentd, domain)
# Allow incidentd to kill incident_helper when timeout
allow incidentd incident_helper:process sigkill;
# Allow executing files on system, such as:
# /system/bin/toolbox
# /system/bin/logcat
# /system/bin/dumpsys
allow incidentd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
allow incidentd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# section id 1002, allow reading kernel version /proc/version
allow incidentd proc_version:file r_file_perms;
# section id 2001, allow reading /proc/pagetypeinfo
allow incidentd proc_pagetypeinfo:file r_file_perms;
# section id 2002, allow reading /d/wakeup_sources
allow incidentd debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
# section id 2003, allow executing top
allow incidentd proc_meminfo:file { open read };
# section id 2004, allow reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/all_time_in_state
allow incidentd sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file r_file_perms;
# section id 2005, allow reading ps dump in full
allow incidentd domain:process getattr;
# section id 2006, allow reading /sys/class/power_supply/bms/battery_type
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:dir { search };
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
# section id 2007, allow reading LAST_KMSG /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:dir search');
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:file r_file_perms');
# section id 3023, allow obtaining stats report
allow incidentd stats_service:service_manager find;
binder_call(incidentd, statsd)
# Create and write into /data/misc/incidents
allow incidentd incident_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow incidentd incident_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Enable incidentd to get stack traces.
binder_use(incidentd)
hwbinder_use(incidentd)
allow incidentd hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager { list };
get_prop(incidentd, hwservicemanager_prop)
allow incidentd hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager { find };
# Read files in /proc
allow incidentd {
proc_cmdline
proc_pipe_conf
proc_stat
}:file r_file_perms;
# Signal java processes to dump their stack and get the results
allow incidentd { appdomain ephemeral_app system_server }:process signal;
# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in incidentd/utils.c
allow incidentd {
# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
audioserver
cameraserver
drmserver
inputflinger
mediadrmserver
mediaextractor
mediametrics
mediaserver
sdcardd
statsd
surfaceflinger
# This list comes from hal_interfaces_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server
hal_health_server
hal_omx_server
hal_sensors_server
hal_vr_server
}:process signal;
# Allow incidentd to make binder calls to any binder service
binder_call(incidentd, system_server)
binder_call(incidentd, appdomain)
# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace }');
# incidentd has capability sys_ptrace, but should only use that capability for
# accessing sensitive /proc/PID files, never for using ptrace attach.
neverallow incidentd *:process ptrace;
allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set {
# Send signals to processes
kill
};
# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
unix_socket_connect(incidentd, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
# Run a shell.
allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(incidentd)')
# TODO control_logd(incidentd)
# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
# Others can be whitelisted individually.
allow incidentd {
system_server_service
app_api_service
system_api_service
}:service_manager find;
# Only incidentd can publish the binder service
add_service(incidentd, incident_service)
# Allow pipes only from dumpstate and incident
allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fd use;
allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fifo_file write;
# Allow incident to call back to incident with status updates.
binder_call(incidentd, incident)
###
### neverallow rules
###
# only dumpstate, system_server, system_app and incident command can find the incident service
neverallow {
domain
-dumpstate
-incident
-incidentd
-priv_app
-statsd
-system_app
-system_server
} incident_service:service_manager find;
# only incidentd and the other root services in limited circumstances
# can get to the files in /data/misc/incidents
#
# write, execute, append are forbidden almost everywhere
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:file {
w_file_perms
x_file_perms
create
rename
setattr
unlink
append
};
# read is also allowed by system_server, for when the file is handed to dropbox
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold -system_server } incident_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# limited access to the directory itself
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;