android_system_sepolicy/public/isolated_app.te
dcashman cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00

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###
### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
###
### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
###
### isolated_app includes all the appdomain rules, plus the
### additional following rules:
###
type isolated_app, domain;
app_domain(isolated_app)
# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
allow isolated_app app_data_file:file { append read write getattr lock };
allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
# tool is broken.
# b/20150694
# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
# Do not allow isolated_app to directly open tun_device
neverallow isolated_app tun_device:chr_file open;
# Do not allow isolated_app to set system properties.
neverallow isolated_app property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow isolated_app property_type:property_service set;
# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
neverallow isolated_app app_data_file:file open;
# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
# b/17487348
# Isolated apps can only access three services,
# activity_service, display_service and webviewupdate_service.
neverallow isolated_app {
service_manager_type
-activity_service
-display_service
-webviewupdate_service
}:service_manager find;
# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
neverallowxperm isolated_app domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
neverallow isolated_app *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
neverallow isolated_app *:{
socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket
netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
} *;