fad0b04de1
Remove the untrusted apps and priviledged apps from the group that can
directly access xt_qtaguid module related file. All apps that need to
access app network usage data need to use the public API provided in
framework.
Test: Flashed with master branch on marlin, verified phone boot, can
browse web, watch youtube video, make phone call and use google
map for navigation with either wifi is on or off.
run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
run cts -m CtsNativeNetTestCases
Bug: 68774956 30950746
Change-Id: I9b3db819d6622611d5b512ef821abb4c28d6c9eb
550 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
550 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
###
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### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
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###
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### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
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### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
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### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
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### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
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###
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
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allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Notify zygote of death;
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allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
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# Place process into foreground / background
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allow appdomain cgroup:dir { search write };
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allow appdomain cgroup:file rw_file_perms;
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# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
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allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
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')
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# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
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allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
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allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
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# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
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allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
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allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
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allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
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# Communication with other apps via fifos
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allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
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# Traverse into expanded storage
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allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
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r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# TextClassifier
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute the shell or other system executables.
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } system_file:file x_file_perms;
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not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
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# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
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allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
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not_full_treble(`
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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')
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full_treble_only(`
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# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
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')
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
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# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app }, vendor_app_file)
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
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# for vendor provided libraries.
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
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# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
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allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
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# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
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allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read };
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# Read icon file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read };
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# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
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#
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# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
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# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
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# and the rules below.
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
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# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
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# domain socket.
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#
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# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
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# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
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# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
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# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
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# creation).
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unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
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allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
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# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
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allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
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# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
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# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
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# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
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# debuggable builds only.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
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')
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -isolated_app }, proc_net)
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Use the Binder.
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binder_use(appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
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binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
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# TODO(b/36375899): Replace this with hal_client_domain once mediacodec is properly attributized
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# as OMX HAL
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hwbinder_use({ appdomain -isolated_app })
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
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# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
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# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
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# are examined.
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allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
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# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
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# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
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allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
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# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
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allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read };
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
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# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read/write visible storage
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:file create_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:file create_file_perms;
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# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
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# accesses to the underlying FS.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:file create_file_perms;
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# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
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# File write access allowed for FDs returned through Storage Access Framework
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# logd access
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read_logd(appdomain)
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control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app untrusted_v2_app })
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
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allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
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# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
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allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
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ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# TODO is write really necessary ?
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auditallow { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } ion_device:chr_file { write append };
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# TODO(b/36375899) replace with hal_client_domain for mediacodec (hal_omx)
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get_prop({ appdomain -isolated_app }, hwservicemanager_prop);
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# Allow app access to mediacodec (IOMX HAL)
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binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, mediacodec)
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# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
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# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
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# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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# TODO: switch to meminfo service
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allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
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# For app fuse.
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allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write };
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
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# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
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pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
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###
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### CTS-specific rules
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###
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# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
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# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
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allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
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# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
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# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
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# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl append };
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# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
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# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
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allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
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# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
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with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
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###
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# Superuser capabilities.
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# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability_class_set *;
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# Block device access.
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neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
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# Access to any of the following character devices.
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neverallow appdomain {
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audio_device
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camera_device
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dm_device
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radio_device
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rpmsg_device
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video_device
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}:chr_file { read write };
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# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
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neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
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{ read write };
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neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
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# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
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neverallow appdomain
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domain:{
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netlink_tcpdiag_socket
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netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket
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netlink_audit_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket
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} *;
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# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
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# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
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# of rooting vulns in the past.
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neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
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# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
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neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
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# Unix domain sockets.
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neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
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# ptrace access to non-app domains.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
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# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
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# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
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neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# signal access to non-app domains.
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# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
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# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
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# All others prohibited.
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neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ sigkill sigstop signal };
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# Transition to a non-app domain.
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# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
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# Exception for crash_dump.
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neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain -crash_dump }:process
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{ transition };
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neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain }:process
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{ dyntransition };
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# Write to rootfs.
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neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to /system.
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neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
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{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
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# Write to entrypoint executables.
|
|
neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
|
|
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
|
|
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
|
|
# that should be writable by apps.
|
|
neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# Write to various other parts of /data.
|
|
neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
|
|
apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell }
|
|
shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
|
|
bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
|
|
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
|
|
|
|
# access tmp apk files
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app }
|
|
{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
|
|
|
|
neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
|
|
neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
|
|
|
|
# Access to factory files.
|
|
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
|
|
|
|
# Write to various pseudo file systems.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
|
|
sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
neverallow appdomain
|
|
proc:dir_file_class_set write;
|
|
|
|
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
|
|
neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
|
|
|
|
# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
|
|
|
|
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
|
|
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
|
|
neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
|
|
|
|
# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
|
|
neverallow appdomain {
|
|
apk_data_file
|
|
cache_file
|
|
cache_recovery_file
|
|
dev_type
|
|
rootfs
|
|
system_file
|
|
tmpfs
|
|
}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Blacklist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
bluetooth
|
|
isolated_app
|
|
nfc
|
|
radio
|
|
shared_relro
|
|
system_app
|
|
} {
|
|
data_file_type
|
|
-dalvikcache_data_file
|
|
-system_data_file # shared libs in apks
|
|
-apk_data_file
|
|
}:file no_x_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
appdomain
|
|
-shell # bugreport
|
|
} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few whitelisted domains.
|
|
# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
|
|
neverallow {
|
|
appdomain
|
|
-bluetooth
|
|
-system_app
|
|
} bluetooth_prop:file create_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
|
|
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;
|
|
|
|
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
|
|
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;
|
|
|
|
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
|
|
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;
|
|
|
|
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
|
|
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;
|
|
|
|
# Apps cannot access proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ files anymore since P.
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_qtaguid_stat:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
|
neverallow { appdomain -shell } qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|